In 1999 the Institute of Medicine reported that most medical injuries relate to unavoidable human error in a context of system failure. Patient safety improves when healthcare providers facilitate blame-free reporting and organisational learning. This is at odds with fault-based civil liability law, which discourages a more open (doctorpatient) communication on medical injuries. The absence of a clear-cut definition of 'medical error' complicates litigation and hence swift, appropriate patient compensation. No-fault systems perform better in this respect. A dual track liability system for medical malpractice is challenging to implement and operate, yet may be the only option for Pan-European harmonisation of medical liability.
litigation.9 Physicians find it difficult to gauge what sort of information patients exactly require and when the 'right' level of understanding is achieved to render their consent legally and ethically valid.10 Analyses of the communication and behaviour of physicians, who never experienced a malpractice lawsuit, and those, who had previously been sued, reveal that the latter have deficient interpersonal skills. They often struggle to develop (emotionally) meaningful interactions with patients.11
There is no difference in quality of care involved.12 A recent literature review on the role of shared decision-making in reducing medical litigation supports this observation. Professional arrogance and failure to diagnose or respect patient preferences put clinicians at higher risk of litigation, in particular when they also make little effort to enhance patient understanding of possible treatment harms and benefits.13 Statistics show only a small minority of doctors is complaint/claim-prone. Yet they account for a disproportionally large number of malpractice lawsuits.14 Prospective identification and proactive peer counselling and/or monitoring of these 'bad apples' might result in less litigation and better healthcare. 15 This is important in the context of (improving) patient safety and patient satisfaction, as the volume and complexity of medical interventions steadily 
1.2
How to Compensate Medical Injuries? When suffering an injury or experiencing an adverse outcome during medical treatment, a patient may sue his doctor for malpractice and seek compensation. His country of residence determines whether his claim is handled within a contractual or tort liability system or a no-fault system. In the first situation, he is financially compensated when it is proven that negligence caused his injury. This implies his treatment was not in line with the required and generally accepted professional standard.30 Contractual and tort liability root in the assumption, that the defendant's culpable fault underlies the injury of the claimant31 and demands monetary compensation. In a no-fault system evidence of a causal relationship between treatment and injury constitutes the basis for compensation.32 There is broad agreement in the medicolegal literature that contractual and tort liability systems do not engage physicians in 25 The inconsistent definition of medical error in the medicolegal literature complicates correct interpretation of US/EU data. Generally, it is not clear to what extent negligence is involved: a crucial factor in any medical malpractice lawsuit. From a legal point-of-view it is essential to differentiate injury caused by treatment from injury caused by the disease itself. In a landmark publication on the results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), Brennan et al. introduced the term adverse event for 'an injury that was caused by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and that prolonged the hospitalisation, produced a disability at the time of discharge, or both' . Negligence was defined as 'care, that fell below the standard expected of physicians in their community' . Adverse events were reported in 3,7% of all hospitalisations. Negligence was present in only 28% of those;40 see Fig. 1 . The majority of patients suffering adverse events is therefore not eligible for compensation through the (tort) litigation system. This was the first publication providing solid empirical evidence of thousands of adverse events in regular healthcare each year. It received international recognition for its scientific quality and is widely cited.41 In a follow-up paper the same group of investigators reported that patients claimed compensation in less than 40% of adverse event cases involving clearly negligent care.42 At best just half of these claims was deemed potentially successful in the usual, complicated and acrimonious legal procedure.43 As the high incidence of adverse events revealed that complications are an inherent feature of medical interventions rather than the result of unnecessary faults by careless physicians, the impact on the political and legal landscape was significant. Interest in non-negligence based forms of compensation gained more traction. The effectiveness of tort litigation's quality assurance role in healthcare and specifically the appropriateness of deterrence as a tool to discipline physicians in how they practise medicine was challenged.44 The observation from malpractice insurers (US) that less than 1% of all medical malpractice cases delivered a verdict favouring the claimant45 provided further empirical support for this. Another analysis on the outcomes of malpractice litigation (US) confirmed this statistic.46 In the US the tort liability system is therefore consistently criticised for being unfair, slow and (too) costly.47 It fails to (justly) compensate patients who suffered injury from proven negligent care, and perversely incentivises defensive medicine.48 The States has a number of special features that make it somewhat untypical, and limit its utility as a comparator in cross-jurisdictional investigation, amongst them the role of the jury in deciding upon liability and assessing the damages, the availability of punitive damages, the rule that each party should bear its own legal costs, win or lose, the largest role played by contingency fees, and the availability of extensive pre-trial procedures to require the disclosure of documents and the taking of witness statements' . 66 Taylor, supra note 60, p. 14. 'Redress would ordinarily comprise compensation and/or a package of care or treatment, the provision of an explanation, an apology, and providing the patient with a report on the action which had been, or would be taken to prevent similar cases arising in the future. Damages under the scheme would be likely to be limited to £ 20,000' . 67 Taylor, supra note 60, p. 15. The NHS Redress Act was only partly implemented in Wales. 68 Taylor, ibid., pp. 10-11. These measures involved (1) the introduction of an obligatory protocol to promote out-of-court settlements of claims and avoiding litigation, and (2) the withdrawal of legal aid for the majority of medical negligence claims. of actions contesting CRCI-and/or ONIAM-decisions in court127 suggests that the quality and consistency of decision-making on key elements of the nofault scheme are subject of growing (legal) controversy.128 It illustrates how the legal complexity of (implementing) an administrative compensation scheme to better facilitate claims of (the most seriously and vulnerable) injured patients with due consideration for its financial sustainability compromises its transparency, fairness and acceptance. The French experience is an example of how operating a no-fault scheme in the context of traditional civil liability law may gradually lead to an even more tangled web of (sometimes contrasting) rules with different liability principles for separate patient categories;129 see Fig. 2 . From this perspective it is surprising that, despite the remarkable growth in the complexity and number of medical acts -and hence an inherent surge in medical accidents -, litigation rates did not increase accordingly in the past decade.130 It is tempting to attribute this to the inversely proportional growth in the number of cases submitted to and processed by CRCI's.131 Although this relationship has so far not been formally validated, the observation itself confirms that an out-of-court settlement scheme can operate effectively as a credible and patient-friendly alternative next to redress through the courts.132 Overall its performance did also not negatively affect the overall positive opinion of French patients about their health system. 133 In 2010 Belgium introduced a similar dual track liability system for medical malpractice.134 Its legal basis, structure and operation resemble the French european Journal of health law 25 (2018) 1-23 system. Its no-fault scheme involves a Fund for Medical Accidents (FMA), which indemnifies patients in case of non-negligent injuries with abnormal and serious harm.135 In the absence of adequate, published data and statistics on its performance little is known about its effectiveness in achieving the government's objective with respect to improving patient (access to) compensation.136
Conclusion
Following the IOM's reporting, that most medical errors result from faulty systems rather than from individual carelessness or professional negligence, structural improvement of patient safety became one of the EU's healthcare priorities. 137 The EU recognised 'that just and blame-free reporting and learning systems have proven to be excellent tools to increase patient safety culture' .138 This is at odds with traditional fault-based civil liability law.139 It may increase patients' trust in physicians, yet this does not affect their propensity to sue.140 More disclosure of medical injury to patients is associated with more litigation.141 As long as healthcare providers are not exempt from civil liability when reporting legally sensitive fault-related information, their cooperation to improve organisational learning and hence patient safety will remain
